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ENVIRONMENTS, EXTERNALITIES AND
ETHICS: COMPULSORY MULTINATIONAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE BONDING TO
PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EXTERNALIZATION
OF ENVIRONMENTAL HARM
Matthew A. Susson*
Developing nations often look to theirbounty ofnatural resources
or willing labor as a means of attracting international investors. While
national and local governments frequently perceive the arrival of a
multinational corporate presence as a boon to their economy, the potential
for government instability ineffectiveness or corruption may facilitate
environmentally exploitive corporate practices. Furthermore, residents of
the subject nation may be left without proper legal recourse. Legislators
have made various efforts in both the United States and abroad to
propound Corporate Codes of Conduct to address such concerns, but
despite laudable intentions, features ofthe increasingly global economy
"accentuate the diffculties of relying upon law as an external constraint
to correctly structure the corporate relationship. " Furthermore, absent
an international sovereign, national taxing authorities are often impotent
to effectively tax corporations to raise money for social welfare or
environmental protection efforts, and the law is often insufficientto provide
redress once the damage is done.
Both American and alien litigants have sought to utilize the Alien
Tort Statute ("ATS') (or Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"')) to address
instances ofcorporate malfeasance, though the ATS has not yet proven
an effective remedy capable ofsanctioning multinational corporationsfor
their illegal or unethical behavior As voluntary codes of business ethics
and United Nations guidelines have also proven ineffective, the United
States must develop or support a legal regime capable ofproviding an
effective civil or criminal remedy to the victims of illegal or unethical
corporate activity.
*Chapman University School of Law, J.D., expected 2013. University of California-Los Angeles, B.A., Philosophy, 2007. Many thanks to Professor Donald J.
Kochan for his invaluable assistance in developing my topic and proposal. I also
owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Susanna Ripken for her thoughtful criticisms
and continual encouragement to become a better student and writer. I am likewise
exceptionally grateful for the love and support of the ever-patient Monica Francis,
as well as my parents Mark and Dana Susson, and my sister Sarah Susson.
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Under the current understanding of the shareholder primacy
paradigm, companies will never fully internalize the environmental and
social costs of their productive processes and labor relationships in a
globalizedeconomy,iwithout an ultimatesovereign.Any practicableregime
capable ofcoercinginternalizationof environmentalcosts must transcend
mere optimistic relianceon the shareholderwealth maximizationtheoryas it is currently understood-within constraints of domestic law and
private contractualarrangements. This Article suggests that exploitative
corporate behavior stems largelyfrom a fundamental misconception of
the shareholderwealth maximization theory andproposes that the United
States create a bonding system under which a federal regulatory agency
Would compel multinational corporations doing business in America to
contribute to an environmental remediation bond, administered by the
United States.
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"There is no United States Supreme Court of the
Uorld.
-Justice Stephen Breyer
INTRODUCTION

Developing nations often look to their bounty of natural
resources or willing labor as a means of attracting international
investors.2 While national and local governments frequently perceive
the arrival of a multinational corporate presence as a boon to their
economy, the potential for government instability, ineffectiveness
or corruption may facilitate environmentally exploitive corporate
practices.' Furthermore, residents of the subject nation may be left
without proper legal recourse.'
ITranscript of Oral Argument at 23, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Feb. 28,
2012) (No. 10-1491).
2
Nick Mabey & Richard McNally, Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment:
From Pollution Havens to Sustainable Development 3 (1999), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/9/48/2089912.pdf.
See Todd Weiler, Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New Approachfor a Different Legal Order, 27 B.C. INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 429, 433 (2004)
("Faced with competition, developing countries may relax or fail to enforce domestic regulatory standards . . . to the detriment of the health and well-being of their

citizens."); Greg Hills, Leigh Fiske & Adeeb Mahmud,Anti-Corruption as Strategic
CSR: A Callto Action for Corporations 10 (2009), http://ww.ethics.org/files/u5/
Anti-corruptionFINAL.pdf (noting that corruption poses a real business threat to
corporations operating in the developing world); JOHN R. BOATRIGHT, ETImCS AND THE
CONDUCT OF BusINEss 417 (6th ed. 2008) (noting the lower environmental standards
in less developed countries and that multinational corporations often exploit natural
resources without making efforts to advance economic development). Many of the
same criticisms can be made in the context of human rights violations, though such
concerns lie beyond the scope of the current analysis.
4
Natalie L. Bridgeman, Human Rights Litigation Under the ATCA as a Proxy for
Environmental Claims, 6 YALE HuM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 1, 1 (2003) ("Although corporate environmental abuse abroad is common, successful litigation of the abuse is
not."); Denis G. Arnold, Texaco in the Ecuadorean Amazon, in ETHICAL TIEORY AND

BUSINEss 555, 557 (Tom L. Beauchamp et al. eds., 8th ed. 2009) (suggesting that Ecuador may be an unsuitable forum where a number of its aggrieved citizens sought
recourse for alleged environmental destruction by Texaco, because Ecuador's judicial system does not recognize class-action suits, has no history of environmental
litigation, is notoriously corrupt, and lacks the infrastructure to try the case).
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Legislators have made various efforts in both the United
States and abroad to propound Corporate Codes of Conduct to
address such concerns, though most such codes remain voluntary.
Additionally, numerous international agreements-including the
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Enviromnent, to which
the United States and 100 other countries are signatories6-identify
the right to a clean and healthy environment as afundamental human
right and "prohibit both state and private actors from endangering
the needs of present and future generations."' Despite laudable
intentions, however, features of the increasingly global economy
"accentuate the difficulties of relying upon law as an external
constraint to correctly structure the corporate relationship."' Absent
See Meaghan Shaughnessy, The United Nations GlobalCompact andthe Continuing Debate About the Effectiveness ofCorporate Voluntary Codes ofConduct, 2000
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 159, 161 (noting that although member corpora-

tions to the 1999 Global Compact pledged to abide by its principles, executives
resisted mandatory compliance or monitoring of their performances); Su-Ping Lu,
Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human Rights Through Deceptive AdvertisingLaw, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 603, 614 (2000) ("The weakness of promoting voluntary codes as aprimary human rights instrument is the lack
of a legal mechanism to enforce compliance.").
6Becoming a signatory to an international declaration does not, in and of itself,
necessarily create legally binding effect. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
883 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that a declaration "creates an expectation of adherence");
Mary Ann Glendon, The Rule ofLaw in the Universal Declaration offHuman Rights,

2 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 5, availableat http://",,www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/JIHR/v2/5 8 (2004) (noting that a declaration is not presumptively binding).
ISee, e.g., Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48 14, 21st plen. mtg. at Principle 1 (Stockholm 1972),
reprintedin 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) (Stockholm Declaration) (stating that man has a
fundamental right to "freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits alife of dignity and well-being").
'Arnold, supranote 4, at 557; see also Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d
161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration asserts that states have the "sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental and developmental policies," but also "the responsibility
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment or other States or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction").
SCynthiaA. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era ofEcononic Globalization,35 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 705, 725 (2002) (stating that one of the defining
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an international sovereign, national taxing authorities are often
impotent to effectively tax corporations to raise money for social
welfare or environmental protection efforts, and the law is often
insufficient to provide redress once the damage has been done.10
Both American and alien litigants' have sought to utilize the
Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") (or Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA")) to
address instances of corporate malfeasance, though the ATS has yet
to prove an effective remedy capable of sanctioning multinational
corporations for their illegal or unethical behavior.' Voluntary codes
of business ethics and United Nations guidelines have also proven
ineffective. " The United States must develop or support a legal
features of globalization is that it undermines efforts by sovereign nations to impose
substantive, proactive limits on economic actors like transnational corporations).
1ld.; see also BOATRIGHT, supranote 3, at 417 (noting that multinational corporate
exploitation of natural resources in developing nations is often exacerbated when
companies "avoid paying their fair share of taxes").
" Bradford Mank, Can Plaintiffs Use hultinationalEnvironmental Treaties as
Customary International Law to Sue Under the Alien Tort Statute?, 2007 UTAH L.
REv. 1085, 1100 (noting that most environmental claims under the ATS assert that
developing nations are unable to protect ethnics groups in their country from the
environmental harms of multinational companies).
1228 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010); see generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute
andArticle III,42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587 (2002).
" Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Seeks Clarificationon Jurisdiction in a Human
Rights Case, N.Y. TMEs, Mar. 6, 2012, at Al5, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/03/06/us/supreme-court-seeks-clarification-in-human-rights-case.
html?_r=0 (reporting that the Supreme Court "wanted to know whether American courts might ever hear disputes under the law for human rights abuses abroad,
whether the defendant was a corporation or not"). Alikely reason for the uncertainty
surrounding suits that may be brought in federal court under the ATS is the absence of a substantialjudicial history of interpretation-from 1789 until 1980, only
two plaintiffs successfully brought suit under the ATS. See Mank, supranote 11,
at 1089; James Boeving, Half Full...or Completely Empty'?: Environmental Alien
Tort Claims Post Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 109, 110
& n.6 (2005).
4
1 See generally Rhys Jenkins, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self-Regulation in
a Global Economy, Technology, Business and Society, Programme Paper No. 2,
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development: Geneva (2001), available at http:/ digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/codes/ 10. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported in 2011 that corporate social
responsibility standards pose anumber of systemic challenges, noting, "[a] funda-
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regime capable of providing an effective civil or criminal remedy to
the victims of illegal or unethical corporate activity.
Under the current shareholder primacy paradigm -which
characterizes the corporation as an economic entity whose purpose
is to maximize shareholder wealth 6-companies will never fully
internalize the environmental and social costs of their productive
processes and labor relationships in a globalized economy, without
an ultimate sovereign.' It is simply more profitable for a corporation
to eschew costly environmental cleanup and externalize costs to third
parties. Any practicable regime capable of coercing internalization
of enviromnental costs must transcend mere optimistic reliance on
the shareholder wealth maximization theory"-as it is currently
mental challenge affecting most CSR standards is ensuring that companies actually
comply with their content," and that "there are gaps, overlaps and inconsistencies
between standards in terms of global reach, subjects covered, industry focus and
uptake among companies." See also U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRDE AND DEVELOPMENT
[UNCTAD], WORLD INVESTMENT RLPORT 2011, xxi (New York and Geneva 2011),
av'ailable at http:/xwww.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2011-Full-en.pdf. It
also stated that international CSR standards, at present, are almost uniformly voluntary in nature and exist as a unique dimension of "soft law." Id. at 111, 114 (recognizing that where voluntary standards are promoted as a substitute for environmental protection legislation, or where such standards are not based on national or
international rules, such voluntary standards "can potentially undermine, substitute
or distract from governmental regulatory effort').
"David Millon, Theories ofthe Corporation, 1990 DUiKE L.J. 201, 224 (1990) ("[T]
he shareholder primacy principle has been the fundamental postulate of corporate
law and is the standard response to arguments in favor of corporate social respon-

sibility.").
6

Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Discretion of Corporate Management to Do Good at the

Expense of ShareholderGain-A Survey of and Conmentary on, the US. CorporateLaw, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7, 8 (1998) ("The bedrock principle of U.S. corporate
law remains that maximization of shareholder value is the polestar for managerial
decisionmaking.").
"1Williams, supranote 9, at 708; see also Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Corporate Lia-

bility for EnvironnentalHarm, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK

ON

INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRON-

371 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2010) ("[C]losing the gargantuan
gaps through which [multinational corporations] are able to evade liability for environmental harm requires some more holistic national and international action.").
11Though the terms possess slightly different meanings in a technical sense, this
Article will use "profit maximization" and "wealth maximization" interchangeably.
MENTAL LAw
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understood-wvithin constraints of domestic law and private
contractual arangements.1
Furthermore, corporate stakeholders-wxxhich may include the
inhabitants of the communities and countries in which multinational
corporations conduct business-will likely be unable to represent
their own interests through participation in corporate governance
under current law.20 Rather, contractual arrangements and other
(positive) bodies of law should protect the stakeholders' interests.
This Article proposes that the United States create a bonding
system under which multinational corporations doing business
in America would be required to contribute to an environmental
remediation bond, administered by the United States.
Part II of this Article will utilize the ongoing battle between
Chevron and the people of the Ecuadorean Amazon, as well as
the litigation against Royal Dutch Petroleum for its activities in
Nigeria, to illustrate the inadequacy of current corporate law and
existing legal regimes in the environnental responsibility context.
Part III will discuss some of the difficulties of implementing
liability regimes in a globalizing economy, including the risk of
disincentivizing foreign investment in developing nations who seek
to impose more robust environmental protections. Part IV will
explore the tension between the predominating shareholder primacy
non and the corporate managerial responsibility to maximize
profits, on the one hand, and the goal of environmental stewardship,
on the other.24 Part V will assess, and ultimately dismiss, the ATS
as a viable liability mechanism for environmental degradation
abroad. It will also discuss the need to reconceptualize the wealth
maximization model to account for greater reciprocal rights in our
19Williams, supranote
2
0Id at 713.

9, at 708.

Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakrman, The End of Historyfor Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L. J.439, 442 (2001) (rejecting the notion that corporate law itself
should embody a multi-fiduciary or stakeholder model of accountability); Williams,
supranote 9,at 718 (noting that the predominant model would find problematic any
attempts to impose greater obligations on the corporation via corporate law).
22 See infra PartII.
23 See infra Part III.
24See infra Part IV.
21 See
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capitalistic system. Part V then proposes a mandatory corporate
bonding regime, administered by the United States, that can be
utilized to curb corporate environmental exploitation and provide
a ready fund for remediation.25 Finally. Part VI addresses important
counter-arguments to the proposed corporate bonding system. In
particular, it analyzes the possibility that imposing greater corporate
liability may prove too costly, interfere with foreign relations and
offend national sovereignty, and stifle investment in the developing

world. 6
I.

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

LAW AND EXISTING LEGAL SCHEMES: ECUADOR AND THE

ATS

A. Texaco, Chevron and the Ecuadorean Amazon: A Case
Study in Inefficiency

The Ecuadorean Amazon is one of the most biologically
diverse forests in the world, home to an estimated five percent
of the planet's species, many of which are extremely sensitive to
disturbance. 27 Indigenous populations have coexisted harmoniously
-sustainably fishing, hunting and raising crops-with these species
for centuries.2 Beneath the forest floor, however, lies one of the
nation's most crucial resources: crude oil, the expropriation of which
was unlike anything the indigenous had ever done."
In 1964, Texaco Petroleum Company ("Texaco"), an
American company, commenced oil exploration and drilling in
the Oriente region of the Ecuadorean jungle, near Lago Agrio.

2

See infra Part V.

26See

infra Part VI.

27

Arnold, supranote 4, at 556.
2
8

1d

29Id
"In reApplication of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), as
corrected (May 10, 2010), aff'dsub non. Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297
(2d Cir. 2011); see also The Americas, Justice or extortion? Ecuador Chevron and
pollution: The houndingof an American oil company, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2009, at

42 [hereinafter The Americas].
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The next year, Texaco began operating a petroleum concession"
for a consortium owned in equal parts by Texaco and Gulf Oil
Corporation.3 The government of Ecuador later obtained Gulf
Oil's interest via Petroecuador, its state-ovned oil company, and,
in 1976, became the majority stakeholder in the consortium." The
consortium constructed 400 drill sites and hundreds of miles of
roads and pipelines, including a primary, trans-Ecuadorean pipeline
that extends for 280 miles across the Andes.3 Texaco operated the
primary pipeline and supervised drilling activities until 1990, at
which time Petroecuador assumed control.3 Two years later, Texaco
surrendered its interests, and left Petroecuador the sole owner.36
In 1993, a group of residents from the Oriente region
brought a class action suit in federal court in New York against
Texaco, alleging that "between 1964 and 1992 Texaco's oil
operation activities polluted the rain forests and rivers in Ecuador."7
Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Texaco failed to properly
dispose of toxic byproducts of oil exploration, and instead dumped
them into local rivers, and onto local landfills or local dirt roads. 8
Experts estimate the primary pipeline itself spilled more than 16.8
million gallons of oil into the Amazon over an 18-year period.' 9
Rivers and lakes were contaminated by oil and petroleum, heavy
metals, industrial solvents, and other highly toxic chemicals.40
' A "concession" is a "contract in which acountry transfers some rights to aforeign
enterprise which then engages in an activity (such as mining) contingent on state
approval and subject to the terms of the contract." BLACK's LAW DICTIONNARY 328
(9th ed. 2009).
2
1nre Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d at 285.
* Id
34Anold, supranote 4, at 556.
"In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d at 285.
6Id
7

Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002).
Williams, supra note 9,at 752.
39Arnold, supra note 4, at 556 ("Spills from secondary pipelines have never been
estimated or recorded; however, smaller tertiary pipelines dump 10,000 gallons of
petroleum per week into the Amazon, and production pits dump approximately 4.3
million gallons of toxic production wastes and treatment chemicals into the forest's
rivers, streams, and groundwater each day.").
40 Id. While Texaco spent $40 million on cleanup operations in Ecuador between
3
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Community leaders and health professionals reported adults and
children with deformities, rashes, abscesses, dysentery, respiratory
ailments, disproportionately high rates of cancer, and other painful
physical symptoms." The plaintiffs sought billions of dollars
in damages, relying upon theories of "negligence, public and
private nuisance, strict liability, medical monitoring, trespass, civil
conspiracy, and violations of the Alien Fort Claims Act." 4 2 They also
sought extensive equitable relief intended to "redress contamination
of the water supplies and environment."3
Touting the ability of the Ecuadorian courts to provide a"fair
and alternative forum" for the plaintiffs' claims, 4 Texaco argued
that the case properly belonged in Ecuador, where the evidence and
witnesses were predominantly located.45 The Aguinda court agreed
and, in 2001, dismissed the case onjbrum non conveniens grounds
after nine years of litigation."
1995 and 1998, independent estimates place the cost of cleanup of the production
pits alone at $600 million. Id. at 557. In return for Texaco's cleanup efforts, the government of Ecuador agreed to waive future claims against the company. Id
41
Id at 556-57.
42
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d at 473.
43 Id at 473-74. The plaintiffs articulated the specific equitable relief sought, requesting "financing for environmental cleanup to create access to potable water and
hunting and fishing grounds; renovating or closing the Trans Ecuadorian Pipeline;
creation of an environmental monitoring fund; establishing standards to govern future Texaco oil development; creation of a medical monitoring fund; an injunction
restraining Texaco from entering into activities that risk environmental or human
injuries, and restitution." Id
44
In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2010),
as corrected (May 10, 2010), af 'd sub non. Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d
297 (2d Cir. 2011).
45Id
46

at285.

Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F.Supp. 2d 534, 554 (S.D.N.Y 2001) aff'd as modified, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002). The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal in
2002. Id Studies show that few international cases dismissed onforum non conveniens grounds are ever re-litigated. Laurel E. Miller, Forum Non Conveniens and
State Control ofForeign PlaintiffAccess to US. Courts in International Tort-Action,
58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1369, 1372 (1991) ("[F]ew international cases dismissed on fo-

rum non conveniens grounds are ever actually litigated."); see also Chris Jochnick,
'A Civil Action, Part 2, 'CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 17, 1999, at 9, available
at http://www.csmonitor.com/1999/0317/p9sl.html ("Studies show that only 4 per-
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Following the dismissal, a group of Ecuadorians-including
many of the Aguinda plaintiffs1 -sued ChevronTexaco" in Lago
Agrio, Ecuador, and asserted claims for, among other things,
violations of a 1999 Ecuadorian environmental law.4 9 On February
14, 2011, an Ecuadorian court levied upon Chevron, a Californiabased company, a $9.47 billion fine-or up to nearly twice that
amount if Chevron failed to publicly apologize for its actions."o
Chevron has adarnantly contested the verdict and hopes to persuade
courts in New York and The Hague that it is "the innocent victim
of an attempted shakedown based on a spectacular fraud by the
plaintiffs' lawyers and members of the Ecuadorean judiciary.",
Though Chevron acknowledges that Texaco polluted streams
and rivers,52 it disclaims any and all liability, citing the remedial
agreement it signed with the Ecuadorean goverment, and contends
the remaining pollution is Petroecuador's fault.
In response, Chevron filed suit in New York against the
plaintiffs' lawyers-one of whom solicited a documentary film
cent of cases dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens are ever re-litigated.").
4See supra note 37.
48
Chevron merged with Texaco in 2001. In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F.
Supp. 2d at 286 n.9.
49
1d at 286. It is important to note that the law postdates the overwhelming bulk
of the environmental harm, and was not on the books while Texaco conducted its
operations there. Id; see also The Americas, supra note 30, at 42.
" Environmental litigation, Monster or victin? A court in Ecuador controversially

fines Chevron a whopping $9 billion, EcoNofisT, Feb. 19,2011, at 70 [hereinafter Environmental Litigation], availableathttp://'.'www.economist.com/node/18182242. If
upheld, the fine would be the largest-ever damages award in an environmental case.
Id; see also Simon Romero & Clifford Krauss, Ecuador Judge Orders Chevron to
Pay $9Billion, N.Y. TIEs, Feb. 15, 2011, at A4 [hereinafter Romero & Krauss],
availableathttp:/xwww.nytines.com/2011/02/15/world/americas/15ecuador.html.
" Environmental Litigation, supranote 50, at 70; see also Romero & Krauss, supra
note 50, at A4 (quoting Ralph G. Steinhardt, professor of law and international affairs at George Washington University Law School as stating the fine "might as well
be Monopoly money, given all the respect that Chevron will show it").
52 Inhabitants estimate that Texaco dumped 15.8 billion gallons of toxic waste-water
into streams and rivers that supply most of their drinking water. Environmental
Litigation, supranote 50, at 70.
* Id The Ecuadorean judge, Nicolas Zambrano, ruled that the agreement did not
resolve its responsibilities towards third parties. Id
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while the litigation was ongoing5 4 -alleging fraud and attempted
extortion." It claims that plaintiffs' lawyers and court officials
illegally colluded and substantially overinflated damages figures
in order to attempt to compel Chevron to settle for an artificially
high sum, though no such settlement has yet taken place. Chevron
has since removed all assets from Ecuador, and recently secured
injunctions from both the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The
Hague, and a court in New York, preventing authorities in other
countries from enforcing the Ecuadorean ruling.
While the litigation is still ongoing, the interjurisdictional
difficulties highlight some of the inefficiencies of current liability
regimes. Furthermore, it seems clear that the Ecuadorean legal
system is ill-equipped to deal with environmental litigation of this
size and scope, and is unlikely to inspire great confidence in future
litigants any time soon.51 In light of the inadequacies of the host
country's legal system to address these problems, the ATS may
provide an alternative approach.
4
5 Award-winning

filmmaker Joe Berlinger directed the film, entitled Crude, which
screened at the Sundance Film Festival before abrief theatrical run. A.O. Scott, Big
Oils Stain in the Amazon, N.Y TIMEs, Sept. 8, 2009, at C1, available athttp://mov-

ies.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/movies/09crude.html.
* Environmental Litigation, supranote 50, at 70.
6Id
7

Id

" Linda A. Newson, Life and Death in Early Colonial Ecuador, THE

NAHiON, May

31, 1995, at 3 ("The system [in Ecuador] is notoriously corrupt; a poll by George
Washington University found that only 16 percent of Ecuadorians have confidence
in their judiciary, lower than in any other Latin American country except Guatemala."); see also Williams, supranote 9, at 751 (suggesting that there are serious
questions about the quality ofjustice possible in the plaintiffs' home jurisdiction);
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HuLTNL RIGHTS PRACTICES: ECUADOR 1,
9-10 (2000), available at http:/"xwww.state.gov/documents/organization/160163.
pdf (noting deficiencies in Ecuador's legal system). While many writers and activists tend to focus on Ecuador's inadequate judiciary from the perspective of the
aggrieved would-be plaintiff, there are also significant risks that plaintiffs can exploit the informality of the litigation process, for example, and generate substantial
political support in order to unduly influence judges or judicial proceedings. See,
e.g., Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal ofFortune: A crusading lawyer helped Ecuadorans secure a huge environmentaljudgnentagainst Chevron. But did he go
too far?, Tim NEW YORKEIR (Jan. 9, 2012), available at http:/xwww.newyorker.com/

reporting/2012/01/09/120109fa fact keefe.
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B. The Alien Tort Statute and Kiobel
TheATS, enacted as part ofthe JudiciaryAct of 1789, provides
U.S. federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over cases wherein an
alien sues for a tort committed in violation of the "law of nations,"
regardless of where in the world the torts occurred." It permits
non-citizens to take advantage of the subject matter jurisdiction
grant so long as the court obtains personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.60 The ATS has become the "principal mechanism in U.S.
courts for attempting to hold nation-states, state actors, and even
private individuals or corporations responsible for what are alleged
to be actual, complicit, aided or abetted, or conspiratorial violations
of international law."' 1 In the United States, the ATS has rapidly
become a "chief weapon" in plaintiffs' attorneys' efforts to hold
multinational corporations responsible for their corporate activities
throughout the world.6 2 The extent to which the ATS permits U.S.
courts to hold corporations accountable for acts cormmitted abroad,
however, remains unsettled.6 3
9""The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for atort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or atreaty of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010); see also Douglas M. Branson, Holding Aultinational Corporations Accountable? Achilles'Heels in Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 227, 227 (2011).
oBranson, supranote 59, at 227.
6 Donald J. Kochan, Legal Mechanization of Corporate Social Responsibility
through Alien Tort Statute Litigation:A Response to Professor Branson with sone
Supplemental Thoughts, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 251, 252-53 (2011) [hereinafter
Kochan, Legal Adechanization ofCorporate Social Responsibility].
62Patti Waldmeir, An Abuse ofPower, FIN. TIMEs, Mar. 14, 2003, at 12, available at
http://archives.usaengage.orginews/2003/20030313_ft atp_waldmeir.html.
61 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) reh'g
denied, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011) and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) and
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 248 (2011); cf Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 77
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is no evidence that Congress
was concerned about remedying aliens' injuries that occurred in foreign lands. And
there is no particular reason that Congress would have been concerned about aliens
injured in foreign lands. Remedies for such injuries could be provided, after all, by
foreign sovereigns under their countries' laws. It would be very odd to think that the
Congress of 1789 wanted to create a federal tort cause of action enforceable in U.S.
court for, say, aFrenchman injured in London.").

78

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20

In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,64 a number of
Nigerian residents filed a putative class action under the ATS,
arguing that Dutch, British and Nigerian corporations engaged
in oil exploration and production in conjunction with a Nigerian
government that committed human rights abuses in violation of the
law of nations.6 5 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
AfS does not confer jurisdiction over claims against corporations,
and that corporations are not subject to liability under customary
international law.66 In October, 2011, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to the Nigerian petitioners."
On February 28, 2012, the Court heard oral argument in the
case.68 Six days later, however, the Supreme Court instructed the
parties to file additional briefs addressing an even broader question,
in anticipation of reargument to be held during the Court's next
term.69 The Court asked the parties to address "[w]hether and under
what circumstances the [AFS] allows courts to recognize a cause
of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the
territory of a sovereign other than the United States."
Though the plaintiffs in Kiobel allege international human
rights violations, the Supreme Court's holding will bear directly upon
the ability to seek a remedy in American courts for environmental
degradation abroad under the ATS. The speculation regarding
corporate civil liability for extraterritorial behavior, however, lingers
for the time being.
4

Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111.

6'Id at 117.
66Id.

at 145.

7Adan Liptak, Two
Human Rights Cases on Supreme Court Docket, N.Y.TmEhs,

6

Oct. 18, 2011, at n11 [hereinafter Liptak, Two Human Rights Cases], available
at litip://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/business/supreme-court-to-hear-2-humanrights-cases.hitnil.
61 Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Feb. 28,
2012) (No. 10-1491)
69Kiobel y. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491, 2012 WL 687061 (U.S. Mar.
5, 2012); see also Liptak, Two Human Rights Cases, supra note 67, at A15.
"Order List: 565 U.S., Monday March 5, 2012, Order in Pending Case, 10-1491,
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, available at http://'
xwww.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/030512zr.pdf.

2012-2013]

II. THE

CORPORATE BONDING

79

DIFFICULTIES OF IMPLEMENTING LIABILITY REGIMES IN

AN INCREASINGLY GLOBAL ECONOMY

Though controlling for negative externalities' is an
exceedingly challenging task," corporate generation of harmful
environmental externalities (e.g. pollution) is an unsurprising result
of the wealth maximization model. Although capitalism relies on
marketplace sentries to establish and enforce certain "rules of the
game," the globalization of the economy provides nations fewer
incentives and erodes their ability to perform regulatory functions.74
Globalization, in particular, undermines nations' abilities
to regulate the activities of transnational companies in an objective
manner, and restricts the degree to which they may exercise
proactive, regulatory power to stave off environmental harms. For
1An "externality" isa "consequence or side effect of one's economic activity, causing another to benefit without paying or to suffer without compensation." BLACK' S
LAW DICTIONARY 664 (9th ed. 2009); see also JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPoRxrioN: TIE
PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 61 (2005) (quoting economist Milton

Friedman as stating, "An externality ... is the effect of a transaction ... on athird
party who has not consented to or played any role in the carrying out ofthat transaction."). A negative externality is "an externality that is detrimental to another, such
as water pollution created by a nearby factory." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 664 (9th
ed. 2009); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNomic ANALYSIS OF LAw 636 (4th ed.
1992) ("Ifeither the benefits or costs of an activity within a state accrue to nonresidents . . ., the incentives of the state government will be distorted.").
72
See, e.g., Donald J.Kochan, Runoff and Reality: Externalities,Economics, and
TraceabilityIssues in UrbanRunoff Regulation, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 409, 410 (2006)
(discussing the difficulties in regulating the imposition of negative externalities in
the context of urban runoft).
See JOHN R. BOATRIGHT, ETHICS AND THE CONDUCT OF BusINEss 383 (5th ed. 2007)
(noting that societal welfare is not promoted when corporations make a profit for
shareholders by polluting).
74
Jenkins, supranote 14, at 1.
Williams, supranote 9, at 725; see also A. Claire Cutler et al., PrivateAuthority and InternationalAffairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3,

15-19 (A. Claire Cutler et al., eds.); HANS-PETER MVARTIN & HARALD SCHMANN, TiH
GLOBAL TRAP 185 (1999) (citing Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former secretary-general of
the United Nations, stating that as a result of globalization "individual states have
less and less capacity to influence things, while the powers of global players-in
the realm of finance, for example-grow and grow without being controlled by
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one, companies can more easily relocate production or outsource
tasks to other countries to exploit more favorable regulatory
conditions.76 While there is less risk of such relocation in the
extractive industries-as the resources can be mined only where
the deposits exist-the problem is not insignificant in more mobile
industries.
Furthermore,
countries
imposing
more
rigorous
environental regulations may risk a competitive disadvantage in
terms of attracting foreign capital investments, due to the perception
that conforming to environmental regulations is an expensive
proposition. In fact, proposed environnental legislation in even
the United States, European Union, Australia and Japan have been
defeated on the basis of such concerns.79 Globalization and the
competition amongst nations for capital investment "has led to what
the WTO terms 'regulatory chill' with respect to countries enacting
protecting laws, with the effect that global environmental regulation
may not cause companies to fully internalize the costs of negative
environmental externalities.""
Before we can explore proposals to compel corporations to
internalize such costs, however, we must first briefly address the
current characterization of the corporate entity.

anyone."); WTO, TRADE AND ENVLoNMEwNr 1 (1999), available at http:/ /www.wto.
org/english/tratop e/envir e/environment.pdf (acknowledging that "economic integration has, or at least is perceived to have, diminished the regulatory power of
individual nations.").
6Williams, supranote 9, at 726.
"But see Weiler, supra note 3, at 433 (asking whether foreign direct investment,
once it has been committed to a particular country, is as highly mobile as some suggest).
78
WTO, supra note 75, at 5-6, 35.
" Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Enironnental Protection and International
Competitiveness: A Conceptual Framework, J. WORLD TRADE 5, 19-20 (1998).
" Williams, supranote 9, at 730.
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SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY

The field of corporate social responsibility, generally, seeks to
question and define the social obligations of companies, as citizens,
to the societies in which they are embedded." Proponents of the
"profit maximizing view" believe the sole social responsibility of
business is to "use its resources and engage in activities designed to
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game,
which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without
deception or fraud."- Others contend that corporations should bear
"affirmative perceived-moral obligations that can be compelled
by coercive force."3 In essence, the debate largely depends upon
dueling-yet opposed-conceptions of the corporation as either
primarily an economic entity or a social entity.84
While a particularly substantial risk of environmental
damage exists in the extractive industries (e.g. mining for oil, gas,
coal, and various materials), most global textiles and manufacturing
operations raise similar concerns (e.g. runoff, spillage, etc.).15 The
specific issues vary by industry, yet the operative corporate social
responsibility concerns all inhere in the relationships between the
corporate activity and the health and welfare of the people and
environment with which the corporate actor interrelates.86
11Id. at 721;

see also WTO, supranote 75, at 35; ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPOLAw § 16.2 (1986) (characterizing the "corporation's role" as "the affirmative,
open-ended goals that a particular corporation's ultimate decision making group
should try to pursue.").
82 MiToN FRIEDMAN, CAPITALsM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); see also Kochan, Legal
RATE

Mechanization of CorporateSocial Responsibility,supra note 61, at 253-54 (char-

acterizing Friedman's conceptualization of corporate responsibility as essentially
nonexistent "unless it happens to be an accidental and spontaneous outcome of otherw ise self-interest financial motives of a profit-maximizing corporation.").
" Kochan, Legal AMechanization of CorporateSocial Responsibility, supra note 61,

at 254.
84
Williams, supranote 9,at 707 (characterizing the corporation as both an economic
and social entity); see also E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate AManag-

ers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932); Adolph A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Are
CorporateAlanagers Trustees:A Note, 45 HARv. L. RLV. 1365 (1932).
Williams, supranote 9, at 722-23.
86Id.

at 723.
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A. The Role of the Corporation in the United States
In the United States, corporations are predominantly viewed as
private, economic entities whose purpose is to maximize shareholder
wealth." The consensus suggests that corporations bear no particular
social responsibilities beyond profit maximization for the benefit of
shareholders." Under this view, "the constraints of law buttressed
in some specific instances by contractual obligations .

.

. will be

sufficient to ensure that companies fully internalize all of the social
and environmental costs of their productive processes and labor
relationships."8 While employees, creditors, suppliers, customers,
and others may possess contractually defined rights against
the corporation, shareholders "claim the corporation's heart."90
Commensurate with the shareholder-centric focus, corporate
directors possess fiduciary duties to act in accordance with the best
interests of the shareholders.9 1 This is often called the shareholder
primacy norm.92
" D. Gordon Smith, The ShareholderPrimacy Norm, 23 J. CoRP. L. 277, 277-78
(1998).
* See Milton Friedman, A FriedmanDoctrine: The Social Responsibility of Business Is to IncreaseIts Profits, N.Y. Tn ws, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32, available at http://www.umich.edu!~thecore/doc/Friednan.pdf.

" Williams, supra note 9, at 708; see also CLARK, supra note 81, at § 16.2 ("[T]
he profit-maximizing norm does not imply that corporations and their managers
have only minimal legal obligations to persons other than shareholders. Quite the
contrary is true. Every major relationship between the corporation and persons or
groups it affects is subject to vast and intricate bodies of legal doctrine and to legal
enforcement mechanisms"); Kochan, Legal Aechanization qfCorporate Social Re-

sponsibility, supranote 61, at 255 ("It is often ignored that the profit maximization
theory is conditioned on companies operating within legal constraints.").
90 Smith, supra note 87, at 278.
91Id
92 The most well-known exposition of the shareholder primacy norm comes from
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.: "A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself,to the
reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order
to devote them to other purposes." 170 N.W 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory ofthe Firm, 21
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B. The Tension Between Profit Maximization and
Environmental Stewardship
While the law provides corporations with many of the same
rights as humans, it cannot rely upon corporations to be constrained
by internal moral and social checks and balances natural to most
humans. Rather, corporations are "singularly self-interested and
unable to feel genuine concern for others in any context."9 4 The
corporation's tendency to pursue profit maximization steadfastly,
to the exclusion of all else, poses a particular risk to the natural
environment, "a resource which only the most selfless and charitable
of human beings tend to be prone to preserving."95 A corporation
would thus seem to owe a de facto duty to its shareholders to behave
callously when profitable. With this understanding, Chevron has
behaved both predictably and appropriately by disclaiming any
additional liability for the toxic production pits and tainted water
in Ecuador, and staunchly contesting any suggestions it acted
illegally.9 6 In its "mind," any obligation it once had ceased to exist
when it executed an agreement with Ecuador to waive future claims
against Chevron as part of its environmental remediation efforts.
Concededly, purely self-interested profit-maximizing
behavior may occasionally induce socially responsible corporate
action, particularly in response to consumer demand.7 Increasingly,
J. CoRP. L. 657, 717 (1996) (asserting that "the shareholder wealth maximization
norm ... has been fully internalized by American managers.").
93Perry-Kessaris, supranote 17, at 361; see also BAI-A, supranote 71, at 60 (noting that the corporation is "compelled to cause harm when the benefits of doing so
outweigh the costs").
4
9 BmIoN, supranote 71, at 56.
95Perry-Kessaris, supranote 17, at 362.
96 See Environmental Litigation, supranote 50, at 70 ("Chevron argues calmly that
it is not amonster but the victim of a monstrous injustice."); see also BAKAN, supra
note 71, at 60 ("Only pragmatic concern for its own interests and the laws of the
land constrain the corporation's predatory instincts .... ).
97

Kochan, Legal Mechanization of CorporateSocial Responsibility, supra note

61, at 256 (classifying such external pressures as "non-coercive, pressure-induced/
quasi voluntary"); see also Lu, supra note 5, at 607 (noting that investors seeking
to invest in socially responsible companies now screen the companies they invest in
for human rights violations).
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consumers seek out socially and environmentally responsible goods,
and voice their discontent with corporate environmental misconduct
by adjusting their purchasing habits." As the Chevron case seems
to suggest, though, many shareholders remain concerned first and
foremost with dividends, not contrition. 99
Current law tends to convert liability for environmental
harm into regulatory fines or tort damages payable to aggrieved
parties. "0Because the corporation exists as a purely economic actor,
environmental harm constitutes a mere numerical value-not unlike
the price of raw materials, shipping, human resources, etc.-in the
broader corporate calculus.' 0 ' In other words, existing environmental
regulations generally constitute mere liability rules incapable of
compelling behavioral modifications-rather, corporations need
only pay to pollute. 0
John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Hnan Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463, 472 (2000) ("[Wlhen Shell Oil
announced its plans to dump the Brent Spar oil platform into the sea, a consumer
boycott caused sales to drop as much as fifty percent."); see also Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational Accountability, 35
BROOK. J. INrL L. 41, 47 (2010) ("[A] company's reputation has become one of its
most valuable assets.").
9
Furthernore, some multinational and transnational companies are large enough to
overcome significant fluctuations in consumer behavior. See Anderson, supranote
98, at 472 (noting that Exxon's size helped it survive the Valdez oil spill).
0
Perry-Kessaris, supra note 17, at 363.
'Id.
See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One iew of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089
(1972). A state must often decide which of two conflicting interests to favor-for
example, an oil company's interest in externalizing the social and environmental
costs of pollution as contrasted to the surrounding community's right to breathe
clean air-or it risks that access to goods, services, and life will depend upon a system in which "might makes right," wherein the stronger or shrewder party prevails.
Id at 1090. Thus, the law decides which of the conflicting parties claims a superior
"entitlement' to pursue its interests. Id One manner in which the state or federal
government may protect such entitlements is via liability rules, in which a party
may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined
value for it. Id at 1092. Though the power to make a value determination resides
outside the purview of the actor seeking to destroy the entitlement, so long as that
party is willing to fulfill its payment obligation, it may not be prevented from trans98
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IV. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
Generally speaking, the law seems incapable of providing
sufficient constraints to address the corporate responsibility
problem. Due, in part, to the complexities of international law,
current regimes have failed both to account for every social cost
from all industrial production and employment relationships, and
to compel companies to internalize those costs."o' Though scholars
have put forth many interesting and creative proposals to address the
issue, 04 the following modest discussion explores only one possible
line of reasoning.
A. Reconceptualizing the Profit-Maximization Model
Some would argue that adopting a model more akin to the
stakeholder theory' of the corporation would substantially broaden
ferring or destroying the entitlement. Id.
1 Williams, supranote 9, at 724.
104 One such measure includes imposing more rigorous information disclosure requirements on corporations pertaining to the environmental consequences of the
company's activities. See id at 709 n.7 ("[C]ompanies could be required to provide
charts about the specific percentages of their products or services produced or sold
in each different country; the minimum wages in those countries; the measures of
economic inequality in those countries; and, to the extent the company generally
pays wages that are higher than the required minimum wages for various employment categories .

.

. by what percentage, per category, the company exceeds the

minimum wage."). Another suggestion involves rethinking the notion of limited
liability as applied to both corporations and their shareholders. Henry Hansmann
& Reinier Kraakman, Toward Udhimited Shareholder LiabilityforCorporate Torts,

100 YALE L. J. 1879 (1991); see also UNCTAD, supranote 14, at xxi (suggesting
that transnational corporations adjust their environmental practices based on their
perception of and exposure to legal liability risks). Still others turn their attention
to more effective remedies in environmental cases. See Bridgeman, supra note 4,
at 37 n.214 (suggesting that, though courts have been reluctant to award them as a
remedy, disgorgement of profits in the environmental context may deter corporations from externalizing the costs of environmental pollution by requiring them to
surrender the profits earned as a result of violative conduct). This Article expresses
no opinion in regards to the merit of the aforementioned proposals.
I0Williams, supranote 9, at 713 n.16 ("The stakeholder theory, also called the other
constituency theory, suggests that managers owe consideration (and perhaps even
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the universe of potential constituents with cognizable rights, and
compel managerial consideration of the environment. Corporate
managers would thus possess social obligations beyond merely
maximizing shareholders' wealth within the confines of the law.106
The call to abandon the wealth maximization model for a more
"progressive" model, however, results from the widespread and
fundamental mischaracterization of the wealth maximization model
itself.
Conventional discussions of the profit-maximization model
tend to accept that exploitation-in this case, environmentalis not only permissible, but obliged."o At its essence, though, the
profit-maximization model in capitalistic systems does not intend
for parties to exploit one another.10 s It contemplates not only the
fiduciary obligations) to a wider range of constituents than the shareholders and
that the content of this obligation is to consider the effects of managerial actions on
other stakeholders or constituents in the corporate enterprise, such as employees,
consumers, suppliers, the community and the environment.").
o6 Id.at 716.
7
But see CLARK, supra note 81, at § 16.2 ("Corporations owe many contractual,
common law, and statutory duties to ... the environment.").
1"Id ("[N]o one need be made worse off by the corporation's having a single goal
of profit maximization."). Adam Smith famously wrote of the motivating force of
self-interest, stating, "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or
the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.
We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love." ADAM SMITH,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NArIoNs 14 (1937). He
also, however, recognized the importance of virtue, writing effusively, "By the wise
contrivance of the Author of nature, virtue is upon all ordinary occasions, even with
regard to this life, real wisdom and the surest and readiest means of obtaining both
safety and advantage." ADAM SMITH, THEORY OF MoRAL SENTWNIErs 263 (2011); see
also PATRICIA H. WERHANE, ADAM SMITH AND His LEGACY FOR MODERN CAPITALISM
180 (1991) ("[Adam] Smith's ideal economic actor is a person of goodwill, prudence and self-restraint who operates both co-operatively and competitively in asocial and economic milieu based on ... morality, law, and justice."); . D.P. O'Brien,
The Longevity of-Adam Smith Vision: Paradigns,ResearchProgranmesandFalsifiability in the History of Economic Thought, in ADANM SMITH: CRITcIAL ASSESSMENTs, vol. 3, at 377-78 (John Cunningham Wood ed., 1984) ("[Smith's concept]
was of an economic system ... within a framework of law, justice and security of
property . . . . Within the framework, individuals pursued their self-interest-but it
was self-interest shot through with social values.").
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need for autonomy, but also the need for reciprocal obligations
amongst individuals to permit each the opportunity to maximize
their respective profits."0 At its roots, then, a wealth maximization
model requires something far less exploitative than the corporate
behavior to which we are accustomed.'o
Economists and legal scholars, including Friedman, discuss
the profit maximization paradigm as operating 'within the bounds
ofthe law'.'"But something more than the technically codified law
should control." 1 Economic actors who fail to internalize the effects
of their activities are using their property in a manner that harms
another, whether or not domestic law prohibits the infringement.
Fundamentally, in order to protect any one individual's ability to
maximize his profits, the system presupposes that each individualis
entitled to the same right." ' As such, when one individual exploits a
resource to the detriment of others, he has unlawfully disadvantaged
the others and unlawfully interfered with their rights. Manipulating
legal regimes to facilitate self-inurement by exploitation is thus
entirely contrary to the foundations of the profit-maximization
model, wherein the guarantees of equality and reciprocity allow
"In the absence of such reciprocity, and given individuals' freedom to pursue their
own interests, a society risks a "Hobbesian war of all against all." See JERRY EVENSKY, ADAM SMITH'S MoRAL PHILOSOPHY: A HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE ON MARKETs, LAw, ETHICS, AND CULTURE 9 (2005).
n0 ATHOL FITZGIBBONS, ADAM SMITH'S SYSTEM OF LIBERTY, WEALTH, AND VIRrUE: TIE
MORAL AND POLITICAL FOLNDATIONs OF THE WEALTH OF N4TIONs 9 (1995) (noting that

Smith, though a strong advocate of self-interest and free trade, made statements

indicating that economics needed to make moral distinctions).
.. See CLARK, supranote 81, at § 16.2 (noting that negative externalities like pollution can be corrected by tort or pollution laws either prohibiting pollution or taxing
violative behavior).
" O'Brien, supra note 108, at 378 (noting that any interpretation of the view of
self-interest set forth in the Wealth of Nations that does not account for Smith's
"sympathy" theory propounded in The Theory of Voral Sentiments will be seriously
misleading).
113In fact, to emerge from the Hobbesian jungle in the first place requires the development of rules of obligations that delineate property rights, as well as an accompanying manifold of institutions of governance to secure those rights. Bruce L.
Benson, Energingfroi theI HobbesianJungle: Might Takes andMakes Rights, in
THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, vol. 1 110-11 (Svetozar Pejovich ed., 2001).
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economic actors to profit without interference. Though the capability
to profit need not be uniform, externalizing the costs of conducting
business in a capitalistic system interferes with the property rights
of others. In short, the profit-maximization model was never meant
to be an exploitation model.

Under this formulation of the wealth maximization model,
"within the bounds of the law" should not be construed so hypertechnically as to mean the law of the jurisdiction in which the
actor operates.'1 Though a domestic regime may not incorporate
certain basic capitalistic rights, there still exist inherent limitations
on behavior that, from an ethical standpoint, should attach and be
enforced. As noted, much of the opportunistic exploitation of lax
environmental regulations takes place in developing nations."' If
such nations were, in fact, mature capitalistic systems with a rule
of law and foundational protections for property rights, these types
of exploitative behaviors would not be authorized."' Perhaps, then,
operating "within the bounds of the law" ought to mean something
more than simply refraining from that which results in jail or fines.
If we ever hope for developing nations-in particular, those
with attractive natural resources-to become mature capitalistic
states, it is imperative they control for externalities and punish
opportunistic exploitation."' The law should not condone cunning
manipulation of underdeveloped or developing nations. Ethical
conduct means more than mere compliance.
B. The Alien Tort Statute Is Not the Answer
Under the AFS, plaintiffs must allege a tort in violation of
the law of nations-in other words, in violation of well-established,
"4 See BOATRIGHT, supra note 3, at 418 ("The mere fact that a country permits brib-

ery, unsafe working conditions, exploitive wages, and violations of human rights
does not mean that these practices are morally acceptable, even in that country.").
"5See supra Part I.
"' See BOATRIGHT, supra note 3, at 421 (questioning whether lower national standards truly represent the considered judgment of its people).
117Id. at 417 ("[Multinational corporations] have an opportunity to play a constructive role in countries making the transition from a socialist, planned economy to a
free market.").
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universally recognized norms of international law. Courts have
permitted causes of action against private actors-as opposed
to state officials-under the ATS for crimes such as genocide,119
piracy, hijacking and slavery. 120 The ATS is used, however, almost
exclusively in the human rights context, "with non-human rights
suits filed under the ATS few and far between and almost always
unsuccessful."l2 1 Courts' tendencies to narrowly construe conduct
that violates the law of nations substantially limit the type of
corporate responsibility issues that American courts can address

under the ATS. 122
Even if federal jurisdiction in a United States court is proper
under the ATS, a federal judge may still dismiss a suit on grounds
of forum non conveniens. Unsurprisingly, many defendants18Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887-88 (2d Cir. 1980) ("It is only where
the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not
merely several, concern, by means of express international accords, that a wrong
generally recognized becomes an international law violation within the meaning of
the [ATS].").
"'Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995).
120 Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 371 (E.D. La. 1997) aff'd,
197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
21
1 Aric K. Short, Is the Alien Tort Statute Sacrosanct? Retaining Forum Non Conveniens in Human Rights Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1001, 1002 n.5
(2001); see, e.g., Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of
funds in connection with allegedly fraudulent bank activities did not trigger jurisdiction under the ATS); Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983) (ruling
that state lottery's decision to pay lottery winnings partly through an annuity and
not in one lump sum was not actionable under the ATS as a"shockingly egregious
violation[] of universally recognized principles of international law").
122Williams, supra note 9, at 765 (noting that most corporate social responsibility
issues "cannot be squeezed into the rubric of piracy, slavery, hijacking, genocide, or
war crimes"); see also Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th
Cir. 1999) (dismissing claims of environmental despoliation in Indonesia where jurisdiction lied under the ATS and finding that plaintiffs failed to show that environmental "treaties and agreements enjoy [the] universal acceptance in the international community" required to constitute the law of nations); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 732-33 (2004) (urging courts to be exercise caution in recognizing
ATS claims based on evolving norms of modern international law).
23
IKathryn Lee Boyd, The Inconvenience of Pictims: Abolishing Forum Non Con-
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particularly in the human rights context-invoke the doctrine as a
basis for dismissal." The doctrine, which focuses on the location of
the evidence and parties, poses a significant hurdle for plaintiffs.'
Certainly, judges have been reticent to dismiss a case where the
judicial system in the country where the wrongs occurred is corrupt
and inadequate as aviable forum for the plaintiffs. 26 C ourts, however,
have deemed most alternative fora adequate in the absence of rare
circumstances." Generally, only where a "remedy provided by the
veniens in US. Hwnan Rights Litigation, 39 VA. J. INT

L. 41, 46 (1998) (noting
that federal courts largely apply the same common law forum non conveniens doctrine to international human rights cases); see also Williams, supranote 9, at 768
(noting that the premise of ATS litigation is in conceptual tension withforum non
conveniens).
124Most

states have adopted the federal common law doctrine offorum non conveni-

ens. David W Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in Transnational
Personal Iniury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 TEX.

L. REv. 937, 950-53 (1990). The chance that ajudgment rendered in anon-United
States court would be less than ajudgment rendered in the States provides sufficient incentive for defendants to argue vigorously for dismissal on grounds offorum
non conveniens. Boyd, supra note 123, at 47; see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235, 252 (1981) (noting that American courts are "extremely attractive to
foreign plaintiffs"). Not all potential defendants, however, have been successful in
seeking such a dismissal. See Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980);
Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002) aff'd inpart,
vacated inpart, rev'd inpart, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) opinionwithdrawn and
superseded on reh'g in part, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007) on reh'g en banc, 550
F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) and aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part, 487 F.3d
1193 (9th Cir. 2007) on reh'g en banc, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) and aff'd in
part,rev'd in part, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (declining to dismiss on grounds
offorum non conveniens because plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence that they
would have trouble finding adequate representation and encouraging crucial witnesses to testify).
125Boyd, supranote 123, at 46, 62 (noting that defendants in human rights cases
have a reasonably good chance to demonstrate an adequate alternative forum exists, even where the country where the alleged abuses occurred has a corrupt legal
system or the presence of violence may pose athreat to the plaintiff).
126. Thus far, this largely applies in human rights contexts. See, e.g., Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyinah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that proposed alternative forum was inadequate because the plaintiff was "unlikely to obtain justice
in Ghanaian courts" and would face danger if forced to return to Ghana).
27
' Piper,454 U.S. at 254-55 (stating that the capability of legal system is the focus
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alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it
is no remedy at all" does a court weigh the less favorable laws of
the fora for the plaintiff.' Furthermore, multinational defendantsincluding corporations, ifthe ATS confers jurisdiction-may propose
additional fora in addition to the country where the wrongs occurred,
which affords substantial leverage and power." If defendants are
successful in seeking dismissal, plaintiffs are unlikely to ever litigate
the case.1o
Even those environmental cases under the ATS that survive
the jurisdictional stage are unlikely to survive summary judgment
or reach the trial stage, because claims based on environmental
degradation do not yet sufficiently implicate customary international
law.1 1 Thus, even plaintiffs capable of demonstrating degradation
by the defendant may fail to successfully prove the existence of
an obligatory, universal international norm sufficient to allow the
party to proceed on the claim.132 As such, potential litigation is
highly susceptible to motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under FED. R. Civ. PROC. 12(b)(6), and will remain so until courts
rather than benefits to plaintiff).
128Id at 254.
129Boyd, supra note 123, at 47.

130 See supra note 46.
"'See Bridgeman, supra note 4, at 40 (noting that until environmental principles are
recognized as part of the "law of nations" for ATS purposes, advocates must seek
further development of international environmental law).
See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting
that the plaintiff failed to show that the international law it cited enjoyed universal
acceptance in the international community, and that those sources referred only to
"state abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernible standards and
regulations to identify practices that constitute international environmental abuses
or torts"); see also Mank, supranote 11, at 1100 ("Purely environmental ATS claims
have sometimes encountered difficulties because of questions about whether there
are universally recognized norms against such pollution."). Plaintiffs have sought
to circumvent the issue by bringing environmental claims based on degradation in
conjunction with claims for "cultural genocide," or other human rights violations,
but courts have been reluctant to permit such claims to proceed. Id Courts ultimately dismiss virtually all purely environmental suits under the ATS. Id at 1100-01
(noting that courts have generally rejected environmental ATS claims based on a
right to live in a clean and healthy environment).
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no longer see fit to dismiss a claim of environmental harm for lack
of universality.
For the above reasons, among others,> the AfS is an
insufficient mechanism to compel multinational corporations to
internalize the environental costs of doing business.14 While it
may serve as a constraint on certain corporate malfeasance that
falls within the ambit of the "law of nations," the AfS-as it is
currently understood-possesses very limited power to substantially
impact corporate behavior, and should not be the centerpiece of a
comprehensive environmental liability regime.
B. Compulsory Multinational and Transnational Corporate
Bonding
This Article suggests that an effective way to influence
corporate behavior under a wealth maximization model is to require
all multinational and transnational corporations doing business in
the United States to post a reclamation bond as a precondition to
conducting environmentally invasive activities abroad. The United
States would require that companies engaging in particular business
activities contribute to a fund administered by a federal regulatory
agency of Congress' creation, with the goal of ensuring adequate
funding for environmental cleanup efforts. As payouts to aggrieved
parties are made, the cost of the bond would necessarily increase,
leading to self-policing amongst bonding corporations. As the
nuances and complexities of such a bonding scheme abound, this
Article purports only to sketch some rudimentary contours around
which such a system may be more fully realized.
1Issues of sovereign immunity and the nuances of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), for example, pose additional and substantial problems to the
effective use of the ATS as a liability regime for environmental degradation, but
any discussion thereof lies beyond the scope of this paper. See also Branson,supra
note 59, at 228 (suggesting that plaintiffs and their counsel are "quickly brought
back to earth, back to law school fundamentals" because of the many challenges
encountered in trying to successfully bring suit against a multinational corporation).
1'See also Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003) (involving
unsuccessful claims by Peruvian residents for lung damage and environmental degradation caused by pollution resulting from copper mining operations).
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The bonding system is not without precedent in the United
States. In 1977, Congress passed the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 15 which requires companies seeking a
permit to engage in coal mining to pay into a bond system operated
by the U.S. government.136 SMCRA requires that land affected by
surface mining must be restored to a condition equal to or greater
than the condition prior to mining, 3 and mandates reclamation
bonding to assure restoration.13 To guarantee compliance, SMCRA
requires a permittee to submit a reclamation plan to the appropriate
regulatory authority indicating how the mining operator plans to
comply with SMCRA's reclamation standards,139 as well as post
a reclamation bond after the permit approval process, but prior to
commencing mining operations." 0 Such bonding is particularly
crucial for the regulatory authority where a pennittee fails to
complete the reclamation plan approved in the permit.141
Like its domestic model, the compulsory bonding regime this
Article proposes would require companies to develop a reclamation
plan as part of a permitting process."' The reclamation plan would
identify the lands subject to the corporation's activities, the preexisting condition of the land and its uses prior to cormnencement
of the permittee's operations, the proposed use of the land post1Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (2010)).
Congress passed the Act in response to the existence of a substantial number of
unreclaimed or under reclaimed mining sites. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(h) (2010); see also
Craig B. Giffin, West Virginia' Seemingly Eternal Struggle for a Fiscally and Environmentally Adequate CoalMining Reclamation Bonding Program, 107 W VA.
L. REv. 105, 111 (2004).
630 U.S.C. § 1259; see also 30 C.F.R. § 800.11 (2012).

7
13 See

30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(2).

30 U.S.C. § 1259; see also 30 C.F.R. § 800.
'30 U.S.C. § 1257(d).
14030 U.S.C. § 1259(a).
141 Performance Bonds, OFFICE OF SLTRFACE VIrNING RECLAMAION AND ENFORCEMENT (last visited Apr. 3, 2012), available at http://www.osmre.gov/topic/bonds!
BondsOverview.shtm.
142The proposed compulsory bonding scheme borrows heavily from the domestic
model, itself a reasoned program developed over several decades. As such, in articulating the instant bonding scheme, this Article will cite frequently to analogous
state and federal requirements.
1See
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reclamation, a detailed estimated timetable for the accomplishment
of each major step in the reclamation plan, and the steps to be taken
to comply with air and water quality regulations propounded by the
responsible federal regulatory agency.13
Once a corporation submits an adequate reclamation plan, it
would post a corresponding bond. In the United States, the Office
of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement recognizes three
types of reclamation bonds: corporate surety bonds, 14 collateral
bonds, 145 and self bonds, 146 the last of which are available only to
permittees who meet certain financial tests. While surety and self
bonds may suffice in a domestic setting, an effective extraterritorial
143 See

30 U.S.C. § 1258(a). The requirements for corporate reclamation plans may

substantially mirrorthe existing requirements for surface mining control and reclamation under Title 30, though Congress or an empowered regulatory authority may
tinker with such requirements to account for certain jurisdictional complexities.
144 A corporate surety reclamation bond consists in a guarantee that a third party
surety will undertake to perform a defaulting pernittee's reclamation obligations or
satisfy any financial obligation or payment owed to the regulatory authority in the
event the pernittee fails to perform reclamation as required by the bond agreement.
See 30 C.F.R. § 800.5(a) (2012).
145 A collateral bond is an indemnity agreement in a sum certain executed by the
permittee, supported by a collateral deposit with the regulatory authority. See 30
C.F.R. § 800.5(b). The deposit may consist in cash, negotiable bonds, certificates
of deposit, letters of credit, or certified checks for the amount of the bond. See
id (listing first-lien interests in real estate; federal, state, or municipal bonds; and
investment-grade securities as sufficient collateral bonds). Collateral posted as bond
must be owned solely by the permittee, be free of all liens, and be valued at current market value. Performance Bonds, OFFICE OF SURFACE MNING RECLAMATION AND
ENFORCEMENT (last visited Apr. 3, 2012), available at http://
xwww.osmre.gov/topic/
bonds./BondsOverview.shtim [hereinafter Performance Bonds] ("The regulatory authority reduces the market value of collateral by a margin sufficient to cover the
regulatory authority's cost to liquidate the collateral in the event funds are needed
for reclamation.").
46
1 A self bond is, like a collateral bond, an indemnity agreement in a sum certain
typically executed by the pernittee or its parent company. See 30 C.F.R. § 800.5(c);
. . see also Performance Bonds, supranote 141 (characterizing selfbonds as legally
binding promises without separate surety or collateral). Self-bonded permittees in
the U.S. coal mining industry must maintain atangible net worth of at least $10 million, possess fixed assets in the U.S. of at least $20 million, and either meet certain
financial ratios or have an "A" or higher bond rating. Id.
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bonding system requires the existence of a ready fund from which
to draw. As such, corporate surety and self bonds are less preferable
than collateral bonds in the context of an international bonding
system in which impediments to effective reclamation-such as
jurisdictional difficulties-must be minimized.
The federal regulatory agency may adopt either a single or
incremental bonding scheme. Under a single reclamation bonding
scheme, the permittee would post an initial bond covering all areas
subject to the permit, even though the initial operations may not
disturb portions of the bonded area until a future date."' Under an
incremental bonding scheme, however, the bonded area would be
segregated into discrete sections, each bonded separately.148 The
regulatory agency should determine the appropriate scheme on a
case-by-case basis.
The federal regulatory authority must calculate the
reclamation bond required to complete reclamation activities
according to its discretion, though federal law should specify
both a minimum and maximum bond amount to provide permittee
corporations with greater certainty and stability. 14 9 Ensuring that
the government collects adequate funds to guarantee reclamation,
however, remains the primary concern.1o The federal authority
should determine the amount of the bond according to a rubric it
develops for the industry in question, with adjustments made to
reflect factors such as the fragility of the ecosystem in which the
corporation proposes to operate. The regulatory agency must
calculate the bond to reflect the cost of completing the permit's
reclamation plan according to environmental performance standards
developed by the agency.1 51 Furthermore, bond calculations should
§ 800.11(b), (d); see also W. VA. CODE§ 22-3-11(a) (2011).
30 C.F.R. § 800.11(b), (d); see also W. VA. CODE§ 22-3-11(a).
49
1 See W VA. CODE § 22-3-11(a), -12(b)(1).
0 See Giffin, supra note 135, at 113 (noting that prior to SMCRA, reclamation
bonds in the U.S. coal mining industry were often so low that it cost the mining
permittee more to reclaim its environmental damage than to simply leave the site
unreclaimed, forgo the return of the bond, and repeat the process whenever it moved
on to another site).
"'See 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a) (2010). Unlike the coal mining bonding system, where
environmental performance standards are based on existing domestic law, the regu147See 30 C.F.R.
148See
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reflect the "worst case scenario," in which the permittee forfeits
the bond at the point of maximum reclamation cost liability.15 As
such, the bond calculation will reflect how much it will cost a third
party, as opposed to the corporate entity, to complete reclamation.1 3
Payments would be apportioned according to projected corporate
liabilities, derived from the inherent risk of the particular activity
and the likelihood of cleanup efforts or environmental remediation.
Tethering contribution to projected liability would incentivize
corporations to minimize their externalities, and thus reduce their
contribution payment(s).
Determining the scope of activities to which the bonding
regime would apply is a sizable task, and likely to engender
significant corporate lobbying efforts intent on securing exemptions
for various industries. At the very least, any pilot bonding program
with teeth must compel bonding from corporations engaged in
highly invasive extractive activities, including (but not limited to)
oil and gas exploration and extraction, as well as mining of minerals
and metals. 1 In essence, the bonding program would initially target
latory agency must develop performance standards for reclamation efiforts conducted abroad.
See OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FJANDBOOK FOR CALCULATION OF RECLAMATION BoND AbouNTs 6 (2000), available at http://wvww.techtransfer.osmre.gov/NTTMainSite/Library/hbmanual/bondcal/bondcal.pdf.
3
See Giffin, supranote 135, at 114 (noting that it often costs mining companies in
the United States more money to complete reclamation of an unreclaimed site than
it would have cost the mining entity to perform reclamation of that site because,
among other reasons, public agencies must often pay laborers and contractors on a
government financed reclamation project higher wages than would aprivate mining
entity).
154 See ANDRs LIEBENTHAL, ROLAND MICHELITSCH & EmTL TAILAZoNA, EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: AN EVALLATION OF WORLD BANK GROUT

x, 7 (2003), available at http://Inweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.
nsf"24cc3bb1f94ae11c85256808006a0046 fb2a79bleb4b9a4d85256d7a00750357
$FILE/Extractive IndustriesEvaluationOverview.pdf (noting that "[e]xtractive
industries tend to have a heavy 'footprint' [or] large, wide-ranging, and long term
environmental and social impacts"). Due to the possibility of continued harvesting
and regeneration, corporations engaged in forestry, fishing, agriculture, and animal
husbandry, for example, may not fall within the scope of the current bonding proposal.
EXPERIENCE
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corporations whose operations, by definition, cannot constitute part
of a pattern of sustainable development.
Identifying the condition that triggers the permitting
process-and thus the bonding obligation-is another open question.
One possibility is to compel contribution to the remediation bond
whenever any corporation conducts environmentally-invasive or
extractive operations abroad, so long as that company maintains
a U.S. presence. A system with such far-reaching effect, however,
seems untenable and likely to implicate substantial constitutional
concerns. Another option would require that companies conducting
extractive activities domestically disclose their mining operations
abroad. The federal regulatory authority would then simply impose
additional bonding obligations-pertaining to the corporation's
extraterritorial activities-as a condition to conducting its similar
business domestically. Finally, a third possibility is to marry the
compulsory bonding scheme to the state incorporation process
in some manner.'5 Regardless of the pernitting mechanism, the
United States must devise a bonding system broad enough to impact
corporate behavior, yet sufficiently narrow to skirt allegations of
overreaching and illegitimacy.
The proposedbonding system disincentivizes permittees from
shirking their reclamation responsibilities. If a company is unable to
demonstrate that its operations will not continue to generate postactivity effects (beyond the scope of the bond and the reclamation
plan), the federal regulatory authority may deny that corporation
a permit.' Similarly, if a permittee simply fails to complete its

mAttaching an obligation to participate in acompulsory bonding regime for extractive activities abroad, when that corporation conducts similar activities domestically, may be the most politically tenable and equitable of the options mentioned.
6
The possibilities addressed here do not exhaust all the possible triggering events
and conditions to permitting that Congress may wish to explore. Surely, in contemplating the proper and practicable scope of such a bonding regime, Congress would
need to stay mindful of prevailing political and foreign relations considerations beyond the scope of the current discussion.
'See Giffin, supranote 135, at 120 (noting that, in the context of the West Virginia
coal mining reclamation bonding program, denial of a permit which forecasts a
future pollution discharge is the simplest way to ensure the public will not have to
bear the costs of treating the post-mining pollution).
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reclamation responsibilities-after it has successfully procured a
permit and conducted its operations abroad-and the regulatory
authority either revokes the permit or forfeits the reclamation bond
associated therewith, the defaulting permittee will not receive future
permits from the United States.15 In the event the bond is insufficient
to finance reclamation, the regulatory authority may collect from the
permittee the difference between the cost of reclaiming the permit
and the amount of the posted bond. Additionally, as noted above,
the regulatory body-not the permittee-determines the cost of
reclamation. 160 Finally, the reclamation bond is calculated such that
it will pay for all projected costs of reclamation in the event the
permittee is unwilling or unable.61
Once the corporation completes the operation(s) for which it
sought a pernit, it may initiate the bond release process.16 Similar
to domestic requirements, the company would first need to notify
local government bodies (in the forum country) and the surrounding
community via available, practicable means, before demonstrating
adequate remediation, as determined by the regulatory agency. 63 The
regulatory authority would release the bond according to a schedule
of its own determination, commensurate with the company's
reclamation progress.164
See 30 U.S.C. § 1260(c) (2010).
"See 30 C.F.R. § 800.50(d)(1) (2012); Giffin, supranote 135, at 113 n.42 (noting
that while this option is available in theory in the American coal mining industry,
in practice the pernittee in such circumstances often possesses inadequate assets,
which thus precludes the collection of excess reclamation costs).
0
6 See 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a); see also 30 C.F.R 800.14(a)(i).
6 See 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a); 30 C.F.R. 800.50(b)(2).
6'See 30 U.S.C. § 1269. Once again, the mechanics of the bond release protocol
will require a substantial quantum of fact-finding and development by the regulatory authority.
3
6 See id. Unlike the domestic scheme, mandating inspection and evaluation by a
U.S. regulatory authority may prove cost-ineffective and expensive, among other
things. As such, the regulatory authority would need to develop aprotocol by which

companies may demonstrate conformity with its reclamation plan. Such aprotocol
may, for example, require that companies commission independent environmental
evaluations by accredited bodies, or submit water and/or soil samples to the federal
authority.
16 See
4

30 U.S.C. § 1269(c).
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To further ensure remediation, the bonding scheme
must include a statutory authorization for citizen suits to compel
compliance. 65 Granting federal jurisdiction to entertain suits by noncitizen aliens of the host country, however, may implicate the same
issues raised by the ATS, some of which will remain unresolved until
(at least) the conclusion of the Kiobel litigation. Due to the lingering
jurisdictional concerns, this Article expresses no opinion regarding
the viability or wisdom of compelling corporate contribution to a
compensation fund-in addition to the proposed reclamation fundto satisfy citizen suits for, among other things, related tort damages.
In addition to enacting legislation to create the bonding
system itself, Congress must create an advisory council or board
to monitor the fiscal health of the reclamation funds.166 The council
would generate reports for Congress, and make recommendationsbased on fact-findings-regarding the adequacy of the mandated
reclamation bonds.167 In addition to legislators, the council must
include members of the scientific community familiar with the

65 See

30 U.S.C. § 1270.
6 West Virginia created a similar coal mining reclamation fund advisory council.
See W VA. CODE § 22-1-17(f) (2011) ("The council shall, at a minimum: (1) Study
the effectiveness, efficiency and financial stability of the special reclamation fund
with an emphasis on development of a financial process that ensures long-term stability of the special reclamation program; (2) Identify and define problems associated with the special reclamation fund, including, but not limited to, the enforcement of federal and state law, regulation and rules pertaining to contemporaneous
reclamation; (3) Evaluate bond forfeiture collection, reclamation efiforts at bond
forfeiture sites and compliance with approved reclamation plans as well as any
modifications; (4) Provide a forum for a full and fair discussion of issues relating
to the special reclamation fund; (5) Contract with a qualified actuary who shall
make a determination as to the special reclamation fund's fiscal soundness. This
determination shall be completed on the thirty-first day of December, two thousand
four, and every four years thereafter. The review is to include an evaluation of the
present and prospective assets and liabilities of the special reclamation fund; and
(6) Study and recommend to the Legislature alternative approaches to the current
funding scheme of the special reclamation fund, considering revisions which will
assure future proper reclamation of all mine sites and continued financial viability
of the state's coal industry.").
167

Id.
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pertinent industries.' Furthermore, it must include a member who
represents enviromnental advocacy organizations, a representative
of the industry in which the corporation conducts its business, an
economist or actuary, a member familiar with the government and
industry of the foreign sovereign, and a member who represents the
general public.6
The result of the bonding system is that the entire industry
self-regulates to minimize bond contribution. If catastrophic
damage occurs, though, the bond constitutes available funding
for remediation. Furthermore, if a party is able to determine fault,
contribution is adjusted accordingly. An effective corporate bonding
system with extraterritorial reach must thus accomplish at least two
goals: assure that sufficient funds remain available to carry out the
reclamation plan, and adequately incentivize pernittees to comply
with its reclamation plan.'" An appropriately calculated bonding
system will signal that the United States is serious about corporate
accountability for externalization of environmental harn.

"6SeeW. VA. CODE §22-1-17(a), (b)(describing asimilar special reclamation fund
advisory council created to ensure the "effective, efficient and financially stable
operation" of West Virginia's special coal mining reclamation fund).
170The author acknowledges that a practicable bonding scheme may permit a relevant federal regulatory authority to develop an alternate bonding scheme so long as
it, too, effectuates the two primary goals. See W. VA. CODE § 22-3-1 (c)(2); see also
30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e) (2012) (allowing the Office of Surface Mining to approve an
alternative bonding system so long as it assures the regulatory authority will have
available sufficient money to complete the reclamation plan for areas that may be
in default at any time, and provides a substantial economic incentive for the permittee to comply with all reclamation provisions). For example, the federal authority
may permit corporations to demonstrate that the host country has implemented an
adequate legal regime capable of sufficiently regulating corporate activity and compelling internalization of any environmental damage resulting from its operations.
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V. IMPOSING GREATER CORPORATE LIABILITY ISCOSTLY,
MAY OFFEND NOTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY, AND COULD STIFLE

INVESTMENT

Even meritless federal suits against corporations may take
years to resolve, and may cause substantial damage to the company's
reputation in the interim."' The costs associated with litigation
and damage control may disincentivize corporations from doing
business in the less-developed countries from which such suits often
arise, to the detriment of the countries' citizens who stood to benefit
from foreign investment.'" The foreign governments will also suffer
economically,-

and may react poorly when American courts render

judgments on a sovereign foreign government's actions within its
own borders.,4
Specifically, in the context of the bonding system, non-U.S.
corporations may balk at maintaining an American presence for fear
of becoming subject to personal jurisdiction in an American court
for extraterritorial acts (with respect to the United States)."1 The
bonding system may thus produce troubling and nonsensical results
much like the ATS. In Kiobel,for example, a group ofNigerians sued
a Dutch corporation in an American court for acts that took place
exclusively within the territorial borders of Nigeria.17 There may
"IBrief for Respondents at 45, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491
(U.S. Aug. 12, 2011).
17 Id.at 46.
173 Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6, American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (No. 07-919), 2008 WL
408389 (stating that ATS suits "undermine efforts to encourage foreign investment").
174 Brief for Respondents at 46, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491
(U.S. Aug. 12, 2011). "These consequences for corporations may in turn offend
foreign governments whose judicial authority over conduct within their territories
is usurped by aU.S. court." Id.; see also President Thabo Mbeki, Response to 15
National Assembly Question Paper (Nov. 8, 2007) (characterizing the decision in
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'1 Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 5 254 (2d Cir. 2007) as a form of
"judicial imperialism").
175Brief for Respondents

(U.S. Aug. 12, 2011).
7
1See supra Part II.B.

at 46, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491
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be reason to suspect the bonding system is susceptible to similarly
problematic outcomes, which raise complex sovereignty concerns.
Nations possess no general duty to adjudicate claims between aliens
for acts committed extraterritorially, and must consider very real
concerns about offending sovereignty and meddling in international
relations.'
Furthermore, the United States could not compel nonU.S. corporations without an American presence to post a bond.
Such companies would, thus, possess a strategic advantage over
U.S. corporations operating in less-developed countries."' Weak
enviromnental law systems will invariably attract the attention
and business of multinational corporations, and a nation or state
may opt to implement such a regime precisely to increase foreign
investment."' The risk, of course, is that multinational corporations
may see lax environmental regulations as an advantage, and trigger
the oft-feared "race to the bottom" in environmental standards.1 so
77

' See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 695 (2004) (warning of the "potential implications for the foreign relations of the United States of recognizing" causes
of action ins which a foreign plaintiff sues a foreign defendant for a tort committed
in a foreign country); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2011).
"'Brief for Respondents at 46, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491
(U.S. Aug. 12, 2011); see also Alan 0. Sykes, TransnationalForum Shopping as a
Trade andInvestment Issue, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 339, 372 (2008).
"IPerry-Kessaris, supra note 17, at 364; see generally JOHN DUNNING, EXPLAINING
INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION (1988) (positing that firms choose whether to trade, license, or invest and where to do it by looking to ownership, internalization and
location advantages).
"0Professor William Cary coined the phrase "race for the bottom." William Cary,
FederalismandCorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware,83 YALE L.J. 663, 666
(1974). He derives it from Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Louis K. Liggett
Co. v. Lee, wherein he described a competition among states for corporate chartering revenues as a race "not of diligence but of laxity." 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933); see
also A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)
(discussing the phenomenon of regulatory competition reducing overall standards).
But see Weiler, supranote 3, at 433 (stating that whether proof exists to justify the
perceived downward regulatory spiral or "race to the bottom" on a macroeconomic
level remains an open question). Environmentalist are nonetheless concerned that
the ability of multinational corporations to do business anywhere in the world may
still result in a "race to the bottom." Shaughnessy, supranote 5, at 161.
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A study conducted within the last decade, however, found
that of the 500 largest multinational corporations, 186 have United
States domicile, 126 have homes in the European Union, and 108
are headquartered in Japan.m' Nearly all of the 500 have a presence
in the United States sufficient to support United States territorial
(personal) jurisdiction over them."' As such, the United States
can lawfully compel the majority of the most influential extractive
corporations to participate in its bonding scheme, under domestic
law alone. International bodies like the United Nations, or treaties or
accords between sovereigns, may further buttress the effectiveness
of this domestic solution, and compel similar action from additional
corporations.
There is an additional risk that corporations-even those
over whom the United States may exert personal jurisdiction-may
contract directly with a foreign sovereign and choose to simply
ignore the American bonding requirements (particularly where the
corporation is unable to procure a permit for its activities).
The federal government may address both the sovereignty
and intentional avoidance issues by seeking to enact the abovedescribed bonding scheme in concert with international treaties
with those nations about whom the United States expresses the
most concern in terms of environmental exploitation. In buttressing
a liability regime with bilateral treaties, the U.S. may demonstrate
its respect for notions of sovereignty, while affording the forum or
host nation the benefit of its regulatory regime and infrastructure.
In the absence of such a treaty, though, the U.S. govermnent may
need to consider imposing regulatory fines upon, or seizing the
assets of, companies who opt to dodge legally-mandated bonding
requirements.

BRUNER, GLOBAL, INC. 131 (2003).
at 228. Another difficulty in holding multinational corporations liable for environmental harm is the fact that their activities often cross
international boundaries, and nations do not generally legislate over acts performed
outside their territory, by those other than their citizens, due to sovereignty concerns. Perry-Kessaris, supranote 17, at 363. As discussed in this Article, it is still
unclear whether U.S. courts are willing to entertain suits against foreign corporations for acts committed exclusively on foreign soil.
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The bonding system is also designed to sta-ve off potential
litigation by forcing companies to consider the impact of their
operations prospectively, which should lead to a net decrease in
meritless litigation. If the government created the above-mentioned
additional compensation fund,1 however, opportunistic litigants
may seek to exploit the system, knowing there exists a fund to
satisfy their claims.18 4 The regulatory agency may limit the ability to
which civil plaintiffs benefit unduly from the system by providing
for permissive government intervention in any civil suit it wishes to
pursue. Ultimately, though, litigants must rely on the adjudicatory
process, and mechanisms like discovery, to deter plaintiffs seeking
to wheedle their way into an American court.
Finally, the prevalence of sophisticated corporate enterprises
utilizing decentralized governance structures and subsidiaries
to conduct business may add another wrinkle to the permitting
and bonding scheme. To prevent companies from exploiting their
intricate and strategic organizational structures, the bonding regime
must require corporations to acknowledge and assume responsibility
for the activities of all subsidiary, cousin or affiliate corporations for
the limited purpose of posting a remediation bond.
The risk that corporations will bypass American regulatory
requirements, or thatbusinesses will reign in investments inAmerican
markets, are surely of great concern. Regulatory agencies must thus
remain cognizant that multinational corporations are not malevolent
entities comprised of evildoers, and should draft legally coercive
measures no broader than required. Ultimately, though, the increased
bureaucracy, risk of frivolous litigation, and danger of "regulatory
chill" are in service of protecting our only biosphere. Simply put,
forcing those who would degrade or permanently damage our only
ecosystem to account for their behavior must trump all else. 1
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See supra Part V.C.
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' See supra note 150.

115See, e.g., Nemeth v. Abonmarche Dev., Inc., 576 N.W.2d 641, 650 (1998) (noting
that one of the primary purposes of the Michigan Environmental Protection Act is
to protect our natural resources before they become "scarce").
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CONCLUSION

In 2010, developing economies for the first time absorbed
close to half of global foreign direct investment (FDI) 86 infiOWS. 8 7
International production is expanding, and foreign sales, employment
and assets of transnational corporations are all increasing.' Given
the increasing importance of corporate investments in developing
countries-as private capital replaces official development fundsthe social significance of corporate conduct is concomitantly
enhanced.'8 9
While globalization has not yet precipitated an environmental
"race to the bottom," domestic regulations have not sufficiently
addressed the manifold of environmental problems resulting from
industrial activities in a time of greater capital mobility.1 90 Certain
enviromnental exigencies, most chiefly concerns over climate
change, are likely to spur a more urgent push for multilateral and
coordinated efforts to combat the results of such activities.1 91
6 "Foreign

direct investment . . . occurs when an investor based in one country

(the home country) acquires an asset in another country (the host country) with the
intent to manage that asset." Richard Blacldiurst & Adrian Otten, Press Release,
World Trade Organization, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, PRESS /57 (Oct.
9, 1996), available at http://'xIwww.wto.org/englishi/news_e/pres96 e/pr057 e.htm.
As a measurement of international production, FDI is a driving force of the globalization process that characterizes the modern world economy. Scott S.Quillin,
The World Trade Organization and Its Protection of Foreign Direct hvestment:
The Efficacy of the Agreement on Trade-RelatedInvestment Measures, 28 OKLA.
CITYU. L. REv. 875, 878 (2003); Kevin C.Kennedy, ForeignDirectInvestment and
Competition Policy at the World Trade Organization,33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv.
585, 596, 650 n.1 (2001).
87
IUNCTAD, supranote 14, at x.
8
1

Id

I"Williams, supranote 9, at 721.
0
19 Id

at 730; see also Weiler, supranote 3, at 433 ("'While it may not be clear that
transnational corporations (both large and small) wield the power alleged by some
of their harshest critics, there is a considerable amount of evidence to suggest that
foreign enterprises operating investments in the developing world have committed,
or been complicit in, environmental ... abuses.").
19 WTO & UNEP, TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE: A

UNITED NATIONS
(2009) (emphasizing the need for multilateral and international cooperation in pursuing sustainable
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As discussed, the ATS should not, in and of itself, be the
keystone of a more effective enviromnental liability regime.'
A sophisticated corporate bonding scheme will more effectively
incentivize corporate internalization of environmental harm by
adjusting transaction costs in the extractive industries.
Any practicable and sophisticated bonding scheme will
certainly require a substantial amount of fact-finding beyond the
scope of this writing. Effective counter-argumentation, however,
should not prove fatal to the general tenets of the proposal at this
stage. While the difficulties of implementing such a regime are
many, the burden of accounting for the costs of environmental
harm must lie with the actors who generate the harm, not those
who seek to clean up the mess. The United States ought to wield its
still considerable economic and political power to demonstrate that
corporations, like men, should be held to answer for acts "odious
and punishable by all laws of God and man."1 9 3

trade policies in light of increasing greenhouse gas emissions, and highlighting the
complex web of regulatory instruments, economic incentives and financial measures that nations have used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions); World Trade Organization, Trade and Environment: WTO and UNEP launch a report explaining
for thefirst time the connections between trade and climate change (June 26, 2009),

http://www.wto.org/englishi/news e/pres09 e/pr559 e.htm.
192 See supra Part V.B.
19 The Case of Thomas Skinner, Merchant v. The East India Company, (1666) 6
State Trials 710 (H.L.) 711; see also Susan Farbstein & Tyler Giannini, Liability
for Harms, N.Y. TIEs (Mar. 6, 2012, 4:05 PM), www.nytines.com/roomfordebate/2012/02/28/corporate-rights-and-human-rights/rights-come-with-responsibility ("In exchange for rights, corporations accept certain responsibilities, including
liability for harms committed by their agents.... Relief from suffering, and accountability for human rights violations, should not depend on whether al individual or a corporation is responsible for the abuse.").

